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No. 71-5 4 45 0 T 19 71 f>u::r ~ C~ t....J2..J..., ~ H"-'-
S~a~ick v. City of Tampa 
Appeal from Florida SC ~~~~--'-"1 a-42----a ~ ~ c-_.; 
 ~~ ·: /kh~ ~o.___. 
4th~~T ~/ ...... o.....t, ~·-_:yv-fL~ o-j~,_.,/.l-u..H_ ' .. ~ 
' eTlant ' '~ 
lf##.i was charged in a Tampa 01unicipal ct with driving while ~
under the influence of alcohol. He moved before trial to quash ~ 
4....c.. 
the arrest warrant issued against him on the ground that it was ~~ 
~t approved by a neutral and detac8:~i:~gistr~e as reguired by~ 
the 4th Amendment. The motion was ~ffi### and appellant sought ~ 
review in the Florida app cts. The.case was heard both by the L~ 
Dist Ct App and, subsequently, by the Florida SC, Those cts ~ 
re~ted appellant's claims. The core of his charge is that ~~ ~ 
~ Flo~ ida statutes
1 
which permit arrest warrants to be signed by ~ 
~t clerks of municipal ~ourts 1 are unconstitutional, He argues that 
many cases decided by this Court have referred to the process of 
su~mission of affidavits to detached «judicial offiers'' for 
determination of probable cause. The clerks are not judicial 
officers and, therefore, appellant says the statutes are unconsti-
tutional. 
/ 
Neither party cites this Court's most recent decision in 
this area, Last Term, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, No. 323, 
(6/21/71), this Court held that a search and arrest warrant 
signed by the State Attorney General was not valid under the 4th 
Amendment because it was not issued by a "neutral and detached 
magistrate." The Ct emphasized that the Attorney General 
was directly involved in the investigation and, therefor~ -was too closely tied up in the "often competitive enterprise of --------
ferretiing out crime." The opinion also cites the long line of 
......____ '-' -
cases in this court saying that warrants must be issued "by a 
judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement 
agent." 
I think the question raised is an important one. The 4th 
~ 
Amendment itself says nothing about what type of public official 
must pass on the warrant, it merely states that "no warrants .....______ 
shall issue but upon probable cause ••• " This Court's 
opinionsindicate that the dominant factor in determining who 
/1 ( ,, 
may issue the warrant is that he be neutral and detached--that 
he not be a part of the law enforcement team. There is a sub-
interest mintioned in some cases which indicates that judicial 
officers have the experience and peculiar ability to weight 
evidence to determine that it meets the legal standard of pro-
bable cause. I think this latter concern is secondary to what 
appears to lie at the heart of the warrant requirement. The 
right to be free from unjustified governmental interference is 
protected by imposing between the citizen and the zealous police 
official an im~l "~" who can weight, without a 
fixed pred1sposition to find probable cause, the sufficiency 
of the warrant. 
--:---_____., 
I think the issue is made more important by the growing 
tendency to utilize, within the judicial process, para-judicial 
p~onnel to handle a greater percentage of tne routine functions_/ 
of our local judges . Whether this is a function which can be 
performed by non-judicial or para-judicial persons , I think, 
depends on their ability to comprehend the issues they are 
forced to consider and their ability to remain outside the main-
stream of law enforcement. 
I must note, too, that if your inclination is to hold that 
clerks of coutts may perform this function, this case may be a 
poor vehicle for reaching that result. The affidavit of the 
police officer on which the arrest warrant was pemised is 
drafted in conclusory, "form" terms. The stat.ute does not say 
anything about judges (here clerks) making a probable cause 
determination (the florida SC rules that a requirement that they 
make a finding of probable cause may be inferred although the 
statute in question imposes no such rule) . This case , therefore , 
we.l/ -
~auld be a Q~ticula£ly_poor example of how para-jueicial 
A 
types can do the job . 
On balance, unless you are firmly persuaded that clerks of 
courts may [l~t act as "neutral and detached magistrates; • I 
recommend that you vote to dismiss . 
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BENCH MEMO 
No. 71-5445 SHADWICK v. TAMPA 
The charter of the City of Tampa - granted by Florida legislature -
authorizes the City Clerk to issue arrest warrants, which are issued by 
the Clerk without any express authority "to determine the question of 
probable cause. " 
In a brief opinion, the Supreme Court of Florida held: 
"The Clerk and Deputy Clerks of the Municipal Court 
of the City of Tampa are neutral and detached 1 magistrates 1 , 
unconnected with law enforcement, for the purpose of 
issuing arrest warrants within the requirements of the 
United States Constitution, Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, and the Florida Constitution. " 
The appellant states: 
"This appeal presents to this court for the first time 
the question_of whether} he independent judgment that 
probable cause exists for the issuance of the warrant J 
required under the Fourth and Fifteenth Amendments ~ 
IJ rna be ade hv a non"udicial officer and specifically 
~ whether it may be made by a Clerk of ourt. " 
The Clerk of the Court is authorized by Florida law to issue a 
warrant upon an affidavit submitted by a police officer. The affidavit 
2. 
by a police officer and the warrant by the City Clerk - involving a traffic 
d 
violation - are se~ on pp. 4 and 5 of the Appendix. They show that a 
rubber stamp was used to describe the offense. There is no express finding 
o f probable cause. 
The Clerk's authority relates only to the Municipal Courts of Tampa. 
I do not believe the record shows what the Florida practice is in the courts 
that try felonies. 
Neither brief is particularly good. The brief filed on behalf of Tampa 
by my friend and Rhodes scholar, William Reece Smith, Jr., is a disgrace. 
It is signed - and obviously was written - by the Assistant City Attorney. 
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SHADWICK v. TAMPA 71-5445 
Argued 4/10/72 
Tentative Impressions* 
The sole question is validity of provision of Tampa charter 
(approved by legislature) which authorizes "the judge or clerk of the 
municipal court" to issue warrants for arrests on the basis of affidavits 
submitted by the police. The charter further expressly empowers 
deputy clerks to do likewise. 
Although the statute does not contain any express requirement 
of a finding of "probable cause", counsel for both sides conceded that 
the statute has been so interpreted by the Florida court. 
Jurisdictional Question: 
Justice Blackmun - joined by others - questioned whether the 
case was "ripe" for this Court. The appellant was not convicted - indeed 
he was not tried. Although this purports to be a common law writ of 
certiorari, it is more like a request for a declaratory judgment. 
I will follow a majority of the Court on the jurisdiction question. 
*These impressions are dictated on the afternoon following argument 
to record my initial and tentative impressions. I will have read, 
in preparation for the arguments, the principal briefs, some of the 
cases and the bench memo. I hope to do further study before the 
Conference. My views are subject to change and to the discussion 
at the Conference. 
2. 
Decision on Merits: 
If we reach the merits, I am inclined to vote to affirm. 
The Fourth Amendment does not specify who shall issue warrants, 
although this Court has held that a "magistrate " must be "a neutral 
and detached magistrate" rather than "an officer engaged" in law 
enforcement. The test seems to be "neutrality and detachment" - not 
whether one is a judge, a lawyer or a layman. 
In this case, the clerk, a civil servant, appointed by the Mayor 
(or a deputy clerk appointed by the clerk with the approval of the Mayor) 
is in the "judicial department of the City of Tamp~ and is said by 
counsel to be an "officer of the Court" (Tampa's brief p. 16). 
There is no showing in the record of partiality, and no s_howing 
..____--= -c::::: 
of affiliation with police. 
In addition, considerations of federalism would justify sustaining 
the Florida statute under the circumstances in this case. 
While a lawyer or a judicial officer may be desirable in the 
role of magistrate, there is no reason why the state should not be 
allowed to use laym ~n or other officials so long as they are neutral 
and detached. 
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Mr. J. Harvie Wilkinson, Til 
Mr. Covert E. Parnell, III 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Shadwick 
DATE: June 2, 1972 
I am delivering the Shadwick draft to Pete this morning. I think 
it is ready for the printer, but want Pete to look at it first. 
Pete can then request the printer to deliver four copies during 
the day on Saturday, if possible, so that Jay will be able to review it. 
We can circulate on Monday. 
L.F.P. , Jr. 
CHAMBERS OF" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.:§u:prm:t <q!tu.d 4lf tqt ~ttitt~ .:§tatts 
~aslrhtgfutt. IB. <q. 2llbl~~ 
June 9, 1972 
Re: No. 71-5445 - Shadwick v. City of Tampa 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me in your opinion. 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
lfp/ss 2cc 6/18/72 
Shadwick v. City of Tampa 
This case, on appeal from the Supreme Court of Florida, 
involves a narrow but important issue. 
An ordinance of the City of Tampa/authorizes the issuance 
of arrest warrant,by clerks of the municipal court. The sole 
questimfis whether these clerks qualiffas neutral and detached 
magistrates/for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. We hold 
that they do. -
We reject the argument 8f }iQtiti8ner that the Fourth 
Amendment requires that these warrants be issued only by -
judicial officers - i.e., lawyers or judges, specially designated 
for the purposes. 
The constitutional testfos whether the person exercising -
the warrant authorit~!2 ~t ~ neutral and detached official,/ 
independent of the police and the prosecution. 
We hold that the clerks in the Tampa Municipal Court 
meet this test. Accordingly we affirm the judgment of the Florida 
Supreme Court. 
* * * * * 
Unanious opinion of the Court. 
July 20, 1972 
Re: No. 71-5445 Shadwick v. Tampa 
Dear Mr. Putzel: 
Thank you again for your suggested editorial changes. 
All are agreeable, save the following: 
On page 2 - please omit the comma after "driving" . 
On page 4 - retain "that of". 
On page 7 - retain "that". Please do not change 
to "those" . 
On page 8 - As to the book in footnote 11, do not 
worry. I have a personal copy, and it is catalogued 
in the Supreme Court Library. 
On page 9 - retain " innovativeness" . 
On page 9 - please revise to read "as to whom they 
entrust the authority" . 
All other changes are fine, and I do appreciate both 
your suggestions and the consistent thoroughness with which 
your checks are conducted. 
Sincerely, 

























































































































































1. The relevant Florida statutes and Tampa charter 
provisions are as follows: 
1. Florida Statute (1967) Section 168.04, F.S.A., 
which reads as follows: 
CLERK AND MARSHALL MAY TAKE 
AFFIDAVITS AND ISSUE WARRANTS 
The. clerk may administer an oath to and take affi-
davit of any person charging another with an of-
fense by breach of an ordinance, and may issue a 
warrant to the marshall to have the accused person 
arrested and brought before the mayor for trial 
The marshall may, in the absence of the mayor and 
cle~k f~om the police station, administer oaths to 
affidavits of complaints and issue warrants for the 
arrest of persons complained against. 
2. Section 495 of the Charter of the City of Tampa 
enacted by the legislature of the State of Florida in 
Section 17, Chapter 5363, Laws of Florida, 1903, which 
reads as follows: 
The Chief of Police, or any policeman of the City 
of Tampa may arrest, without warrant, any person 
violating any of the ordinances of said city, com-
mitted in the presence of such officer, and when 
knowledge of the violation of any ordinance of said 
city shall come to said chief of police or policeman, 
not committed in his presence, he shall at once make 
affidavit, before the judge or clerk of the municipal 
court, against the person charged with such vio-
lation, whereupon said judge or cl€rk shall issue 
a warrant for the 'arrest of such person. 
3. Section 160 . .. of the Charter of the City of 
Tampa enacted by the legislature of the State 'Of Florida 
in Section 1, Chapter 61-2915, Laws of Florida, 1961, 
which reads as follows: ... 
The city clerk of the City of Tampa, with the ap-
proval of the mayor, may appoint one or more 
deputies, such deputy or deputies to be selected 
from the approved classified list of the city civil 
service, and to have and exercise the same powers 
as the city clerk himself, including but not limited 
to the issuance of warrants. One or more of such 
deputies may be designated as clerks of the muni-
cipal court. 
2. 
2. Transcript of Oral Argument, p. 6, 7, 20, 21. 
3. Appellant's Brief p. 6; Transcript of Oral Argument, 
p. 10. 
4. Appellant's Brief p. 12-13; Reply Brief p. 8. 
5. Reply Brief p. 8; Transcript of Oral Argument, 
p. 10-12. 
6. The U. S. Commissioner system has, of course, 
been replaced by the Federal Magistrates Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 
1107. 
7. Webster's Dictionary, 2nd edition, 1957, defines 
magistrate as "a person clothed with power as a public civil 
officer; a public civil officer invested with executive or 
judicial powers, ... " or, more narrowly, "a magistrate of 
a class having summary, often criminal, jurisdiction, as a 
justice of the peace, or one of certain officials having a 
similar jurisdiction; ... " Random House Dictionary (1966) 
defines magistrate as (1) "a civil officer charged with the 
3. 
administration of the law" and (2) a minor judicial officer, 
as a justice of the peace, or police justice, having jurisdiction 
to try minor criminal cases and to conduct preliminary 
examinations of persons charged with serious crimes. " 
8. U.S. Commissioners were not required to be lawyers 
until passage of the Federal Magistrates Act of 1968. Even under 
this act, a limited exception to lawyers status is afforded 
part-time magistrates. 28 U.S. C. 631 (b)(1). 
9. Transcript of Oral Argument p. 10. 
10. The Federal ~Magistrates Act explicitly 
makes provision for non-lawyers to be appointed in those 
communities where members of the bar are not available. 
28 u.s. c. 631 (b)(1). 
11. See, generally, C. Whitebread ed., Mass Production 
Justice and the Constitutional Ideal (1970). 
12. states differ significantly in whom they entrust 




.~n follow.ed..i.ZJ. ... f.ourteen-states. Burke v. Superior 
Court} 3 Ariz. App. 576, 416 P. 2d 997, 1000 (Ct. App. 
Ariz. 1966); Parks v. Superior Court) 236 P.2d 874, 882 
(1st D.C.A. Calif. 1951); Kennedy v. Walker) 135 Conn. 
262, 63 A.2d 589, 594 (Sup. Ct. Conn. 1948) ;~hadwick 
v. City of Tampa) 250 So. 2d 4 (Sup. Ct. Fla. 1971) ; State 
v. Swafford) 250 Ind. 541, 237 N.E. 2d 580, 584 (Sup. 
4. 
\ 
67C<-}?" i/. .s r . .Je:: 
1 
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-71:J. 7/'f ( s ~ .. l' cr. Dd. t7t.,'l) , 
jhw/ss 6/1/72 lee 
No. 71-5445 Shadwick v. City of Tampa 
The charter of Tampa, Florida authorizes the issuance 
of certain arrest warrants by clerks of the Tampa Municipal 
1 
Court. The sole question in this case is whether these clerks 
qualify as neutral and detached magistrates for purposes of the 
Fourth Amendment. We hold that they do. 
Appellant was ~ arrested for impaired driving 
on a warrant issued by a clerk of the Municipal Court. He 
moved the court to quash the warrant as issued by a non-judicial 
officer in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth .Amendments. 
When the motion was denied, he initiated proceedings through 
the Florida courts by means of that state's Wright of Common 
Law Certiorari. The state proceedings culminated in the holding 
of the Florida Supreme Court that "the clerk and deputy clerks 
of the municipal court of the city of Tampa are neutral and 
lblbndetached magistrates ... for the purpose of issuing 
2. 
arrest warrants within the requirements of the United States 
Constitution .... " 250 So. 2d 4, 5 (1971). We granted 
certiorari, u.s. -- (197 ). 
A brief description of the clerk's position is necessary. 
He is p appointed by the City Clerk from a classified list of civil 
\ 
servants, and assigned to work in the 1\.funicipal Court. The 
statute does not specify what qualifications are necessary for this 
job, but no law degree or intensive legal training is required. 
The clerk's duties are to receive traffic fines, prepare the court's 
dockets and records, fill out commitment papers and perform 
other routine clerical tasks. Apparently he may issue subpoenas. 
He may not, however, sit as a judge, and he may not issue a 
search warrant or even a felony or misdemeanor arrest warrant. 
In fact, the only warrant he may grant is for the arrest of 
2 





Appellant contends that even this limited warrant authority 
of the clerk breaches an alleged Fourth Amendment requirement 
that issuing magistrates be exclusively "judicial officers. " He 
contends further that warrant applications of whatever nature 
cannot be assured the discerning, independent review compelled 
by the .Fourth .Amendment when the review is performed by less 
3 
than a judicial officer. It is less than clear, however, as to who 
may qualify as a "judicial officer." To some, this term may 
implya only a lawyer or judge. There is some suggestion in 
appellant's brief that a judicial officer might profitably be a 
4 
lawyer or the municipal court judge himself. A more complete 
portrayal of appellant's position would be that the Tampa clerks 
are disqualified as judicial officers not merely because they are 
not lawyers or judges, but because ib;c they lack the institutional 
independence associated with the judiciary in that they are 




executive official, " and enjoy no ~ statutorily specified 
5 
tenure a in office. 
Past decisions of the Court have admittedly mentioned 
review by a "judicial officer'' prior to issuance of a warrant 
~itley v. Warden, 401 U. s. 560, 564 (1971); Katz v. United 
states, 389 U.S. 347, 356 (1967); Wong Sun v. United States, 
371 U.S. 471, 481-2 (1963); Jones v. United states, 362 U.S. 
257, 270 (1960); Johnson v. United states, 333 U.s. 10, 14 (1948) 
In some cases the term, "judicial officer" appears to have 
been used interchangeably with that of "magistrate." Katz v. 
United states! and .Johnson v. United states, supra. In others 
it was intended simply to underscore the now accepted fact that 
someone independent of the police and prosecution must determine 
probable cause. 1lldm Jone~ v. United States1 :aa.r.a supra; Wong Sun v. 
~ted Stat~ supra. The very term "judicial officer" implies, 





But it has never suggested that only a lawyer or judge could 
grant a warrant, regardless of the court system involved or the 
type of warrant to be sought. In Jones,supra, 270-271, the 
Court implied that U. S. Commissioners, many of whom were 
not lawyers or judges, were nonetheless "independent judicial 
6 
officers. " 
The Court has also frequently employed the term "magistrate" 
to denote those who may issue warrants, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 
403 U.s. 443, 449-5:t(1971); Whitley v. Warden, supra, at 56~. 
' 
Katz v. United states, supra, at 356-7; United states v. Ventreca, 
380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965); Giondenello v. United states, 357 U.s. 
480, 486 (1958); Johnson v. United states, supra, at 13-14; 
-
United states v. Lefhowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932). Historically 
a magistrate has been broadly defined as "a plmda public civil 
officer, possessing such power, legislative, executive or judicial, 
as the government appointing him may ordain, " Compton v. 
Alabam!t 214 U.S. 1, 7 (1909), or, in a narrower sense "an 
inferior judicial officer, such as a justice of the peace. " Id. 
7 
6. 
More recent definitions have not much changed. In Compton, a 
notary public was deemed a magistrate under fkle Georgia law 
and hence for the purposes of federal fugitive from justice statutes. 
The Court has nowhere indicated, however, that magistrate means 
solely a lawyer or judge. 
An examination of the Court's decisions thus reveals the 
terms "magistrate" and "judicial officer" to have been inter-
changeable. Little attempt was made to define either term, to 
distinguish the one from the other, or to advance one as the 
difinitive Fourth Amendment requiremenbs. We find no command-
ment in either term, however, that all warrant authority must 
' reside exclusively in a lawyer or judge. Such a requirement would 
have been incongruous when even within the federal system, warrants 
8 
were until recently widely issued by non-lawyers. 
l' 
7. 
To attempt to extract further significance from the above 
terminology would be both divesting and elusive. The substance 
of the Court's warrant concerns does not turn on the labelling 
of the issuing party. The warrant has traditionally represented 
an independent assurance that a search and arrest will not proceed 
without cause. Thus an issuing magistrate must meet two tests. 
He must be neutral and detached, and he must be capable of 
determining Jl1iJm: whether probable cause exists for the requested 
arrest or search. This Court has long insisted that probable 
cause be drawn by "a neutral and detached magistrate instead 
of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive 
enterprise of ferreting out crime." Johnson v. United States, 
!~~ at 13-14; Giondenello v. United States, SliD supra, at 
486. In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, the Court last term 
voided a search warrant issued by the state Attorney General 






to be chief prosecutor at trial. " Id. at 450. If, on the other hand, 
detachment and capacity do conjoin, the magistrate has satisfied 
the Fourth Amendment's purpose. 
The requisite detachment is present in the case at hand. 
Whatever else neutrality and detachment might entail, it is clear 
that it requires severance and disengagement from activities of 
law enforcement. There has been no showing whatever here of 
paritiality or affiliation of these clerks with prosecutors or police. 
The record shows no disqualifying connection with any law 
enforcement activity or authority which would distort the 
independent judgment the Fourth Amendment requires. Appellant 
9 
himself expressly refused to allege anythign to that effect. 
A primary responsibility of the clerk, far from being to the 
J1ik police or prosecutor, is instead to the Municipal Court judge 
to whom he is assigned and for whom he works. In this sense, 
he may well be termed a judicial officer. While a statutorily 
.. 
9. 
specified term of office and appointment by someone other than 
"an executive authority" might be desirable, the absence of such 
fe tures is hardly disqualifying. Judges themselves take office 
under differing and less than independent circumstances. Some 
are elected, but most are appointed by executive authority. 
Many enjoy but limited terms and are subject to executive 
reappointment. Most depend for their salary level upon the 
legislative branch. This Court refuses, therefore, to vault 
requirements for the independence of a municipal clerk to a 
hypocritically high level. His neutrality is clear enough: he 
is removed from prosecutor or police and works within the 
judicial branch subject to the supervision of the Municipal 
court judge. 
Appellant has likewise failed to demonstrate that these 
clerks lack capacity to determine probable cause. The clerk's 
authority extends only to the issuance of arrest warrants for 
10. 
breach of municipal ordinances. We presume from the nature of 
the clerk's position that he would be able to deduce from the 
facts on an affidavit before him whether there was probable cause 
to believe a citizen quilty of & impaired driving, breach of peace, 
drunkenness, trespass or the multiple other common offenses 
covered by a municipal code. There has been no showing that 
this is too complex an endeavor for a clerk to accomplish. Our 
legal system has long entrusted non-lawyers to evaluate more 
complex and significant factual data than that in the case at hand. 
Grand juries daily determine probable cause prior to indictments, 
and trial juries assess whether guilt is proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The significanee and responsibility of these lay judgments 
betrays any belief that the Tampa clerks could net determine 
proble cause for arrest. 
We decide tcxiay only that clerks of the Municipal Court 
may constitutionally grant the warrants in question. We have 
11. 
not considered whether the actual issuance followed a sufficient 
determination of probable cause. The affidavit in this case may 
have been so bare and conclusory in its terms as to invalidate 
the issuance of any warrant based upon it. Aguilar v. Texas, 
378 U.S. 108 (1964). Appellant, however, did not submit this 
question to the courts below, 237 So. 2d 231 (19 ), 250 So. 2d 
4 (1971), and we will not decide it here initially. The single 
question thus remains whether power has been lawfull vested, 
not whether it has been constitutionally exercised. V\B 
We also do not imply that the state may lodge warrant 
authority in anyone outside the sphere of law enforcement. 
Many persons may not qualify as the kind of "public civil officers" 
we have come to associate with the term "magistrate. " We 
recognize also that we have not resolved fully the question of \ 
whether and to what degree issuing magistrates must be 










city or state in which they work. Had the clerk been more 
divorced from a judicial position, this case might be a different 
one. Here, however, the clerk is a functioning part of the judicial 
branch of the city of Tampa, ~ disassociated from the 
affairs of law enforcement, and the independent nature of his 
position is fully satisfied. 
What we do reject today is any per se invalidation of 
a state or local warrant system on the sole grounds that the 
issuing magistrate is not a lawyer or judge. This Court will 
not lightly fasten on every~ unit of state and local govern-
ment requirements potentially inimical to their individuals needs 
and interests. Many communities may have a shortage of lawyers 
or judges and need to delegate the responsibility of issuing warrants 
10 
to other available and competent personnel. Many municipal 
11 
courts, moreover, face stiff and unrelenting caseloads, and 
a judge pressured with the docket before him, may give warrant 
' 
13. 
applications more brisk and summary treatment than would a 
clerk. All this is not to imply that)j a judge or lawyer would not 
ideally provide the most desirable review for warrant requests. 
But our federal system warns of converting desirable practice 
into constitutional commandment. Rather it recognizes in plural 
12 
and diverse state activity/ one key to national innovativeness 
and vitality. Harlan, Thoughts at a Dedication: Keeping the 
Judicial F\mcti<?!!_ in Bal~nce, 49 A. B. A. J. 943, 944 (1963). 
States are entitled irlosomJix to some flexibility and leeway in their 
designation of ~ magistrates, so long as all are neutral 
and detached and capable of the probable cause determination 
required of them. 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opnnon of the 
Court. 
The charter of Tampa, Florida, authorizes the issuance 
of certain arrest warrants by clerks of the Tampa Mu-
nicipal Court. 1 The sole question in this case is whether 
1 The relen111t Floridrt stn.tutes nnd Tnmpn rhnrter pro1·i~ions 
arr n~ follows: 
"1. Floridn, Stntute (19G7) Section 168.04, F. S. A., \\·h ich rr:1ds 
ns follows: 
"CLERK AND MAHRHALL l\IAY TAKE 
AFFIDAVITS AND ISSUE WARRANTS 
"The clerk mny administer nn onth to nnd take affidavit of any 
prrson chnr!J;ing nnolhrr with nn offrnsr by brrneh of nn ordinnnce, 
and mny issue a wnrrant to the mnrshnll to hrtYc thr nccusec! prrson 
arrested nnd brought before the mn~·or for trial. The marshall may, 
in the nb~ence of thr ma~·or nne! clerk from the police station, ad-
minister oaths to nfTidavits of rompbints nne! issue warrnnts for 
the arrei't of per~ons complnined ngainst. 
"2. Section 495 of the Charter of the City of Tampn enacted by 
the legislature of the Stntr of Florida in Section 17, Chapter 5303, 
Laws of Floridn, 1903, \\·hieh read~ no follows: 
"The Chief of Police, or any policrman of the City of Tampa mny 
arrest, without w:urnnt, any per,;on 1·iolat ing any of the ordinances 
of said city, committed in the presence of such offirer, nne! when 
knowledge of thr violntion of any ordinancr of said city shnll come 
to snicl chief of poli<'e or policC'mnn, not <'Ommittecl in his presrnce, 
he shall at once make affida,·it, before the judge or clerk of the 
municipal court, agninst thC' pC'r~on charged with such violntion, 
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these clerks qualify as neutral and detached magistrates 
for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. We hold that 
they do. 
Appellant was arrested for impaired driving on a war-
rant issued by a clerk of the municipal court. He moved 
the court to quash the warrant on the ground that it was 
issued by a nonjudicial officer in violation of the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. 'When the motion was 
denied, he initiated proceedings in tho Florida courts by 
moans of that State's writ of common law certiorari. 
Tho state proceedings culminated in tho holding of the 
Florida Supremo Court that "the clerk and deputy clerks 
of the municipal court of the city of Tampa are neutral 
and detached magistrates ... for tho purpose of issuing 
arrest warrants within tho requirements of tho United 
States Constitution .... " 250 So. 2cl 4, 5 (1971). We 
granted certiorari, 404 U. S. 1014 (1972). 
I 
A clerk of the munipical court is appointed by the city 
clerk from a classified list of civil servants, and assigned 
to work in the municipal court. Tho statuto docs not 
specify tho qualifications llecessary for this job, but no 
law degree or special legal training is required. The 
clerk's duties are to receive traffic fines, prepare the 
court's dockets and records, fill out commitment papers 
whereupon snicl judge or clerk ~hall i~~ue a w:11Tant for the nrre~l of 
surh per;;on. 
"3. Section 160 of the Charter of the Cit~· of Tampa ennrted by 
the lrgislature of the State of Florida in Section 1, Chaplrr 61-2915, 
Laws of Florida, 1!)61, which read~ ns follow~: 
"The city clrrk of the City of Tampa, with the appro1·al of the 
ma~·or, may nppoint onr or morr drpnlit'~, ~urh dq1nly or drputies 
to be selrrted from the nppr01wl r!:Jssified list of the city ci1·il ~en·ire, 
r1nd to have nne! excrci~e the ~:mw. powers as the city clerk himself, 
induding but not limilrcl to the issuance of warrnnts. One or more 
of such deputies may br cleoignntccl as clerks of the municipal court." 
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and perform other routine clerical tasks. Apparently he 
may issue subpoenas. He may not, ho\\'ever, sit as a 
judge, and he may not issue a search \\'arrant or even a 
felony or misdemeanor arrest warrant for violations of 
state laws. The only 'mrrants he may issue are for the 
arrest of those charged with having breached municipal 
ordinances of the city of Tampa.2 
Appellant, contending that the Fourth Amendment 
requires that warrants be issued by "judicial officers," 
argues that even this limited "·an·ant authority is con-
stitutionally invalid. He reasons that warrant applica-
tions of whatever nature cannot be assured the discern-
ing, independent review compelled by the Fourth Amend-
ment "·hen the review is performed by less than a judicial 
officer.'1 It is less than clear, however, as to who would 
qualify as a "judicial officer" under appellant's theory. 
There is some suggestion in appellant's brief that a ju-
dicial officer must be a lawyer or the municipal court 
judge himself:' A more complete portrayal of appellant's 
position would be that the Tampa clerks are disqualified 
as judicial officers not merely because they are not lawyers 
or judges. but because they lack the institutional inde-
pendence associated with the judiciary in that they are 
members of the civil service, appointed by the city clerk. 
"an executive official," and enjoy no statutorily specified 
tenure in office." 
II 
Past decisions of the Court have mentioned rev1ew 
by a "j uclicial officer" prior to issuance of a warrant, 
Whitley Y. Warden, 401 U. S. 560, 564 (1971); Katz v. 
United States, 389 U. S. 347, 356 (Hl67); Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U. S. 471, 481-482 (1963); Jones v. 
"Tr. of Oral Ar~J: ., pp. 6, 7, 20, 21. 
'1 Apprllanl's Brirf, p. 6; Tr. of Oral Arg., p. 10. 
1 A]lprlbnt's Brief, pp. 12-1B; Hrply Brirf, p. 8. 
r. Rrply Brief, Jl. 8; Tr. of Oral Arg., pp. 10-12. 
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United States, 3G2 U. S. 257, 270 (1960); Johnson v. 
United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14 (1948). In some cases 
the term "judicial officer" appears to have been used 
interchangeably with that of "magistrate." Katz Y. 
United States, and Johnson v. United States, supra. In 
others it was intended simply to underscore the now ac-
cepted fact that someone independent of the police and 
prosecution must determine probable cause. Jones v .. 
United States, supra; Wong Sun v. United States, supra. 
The very term "judicial officer" implies, of course, some 
connection "·ith the judicial branch. But it has never 
been held that only a la·wyer or judge could grant a 
warrant, regardless of the court system or the type of 
warrant involved. In Jones, supra, 270-271, the Court 
implied that United States Commissioners, many of 
whom were not lawyers or judges, were nonetheless "inde-
pendent judicial officers." G 
The Court frequently has employed the term "magis-
trate" to denote those who may issue warrants. Coolidge 
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449-453 (1971); Whit-
ley v. Warden, supra, at 566; Katz v. United States, supra, 
at 356-357; United States\'. F entreca, 380 U. S. 102, 108 
(1965); Giondenello v. United States, 357 U. S. 480, 486 
(1958); Johnson v. United States, supra, at 13-14; United 
States v. Lefhowitz, 285 U. S. 452, 464 (1932). Histori-
cally a magistrate has been defined broadly as "a public 
civil officer, possessing such power, legislative, executive 
or judicial, as the govermnent appointing him may or-
dain," Compton v. Alabama, 214 U. S. 1, 7 (1909), or, 
in a narrower sense "an inferior judical officer, such as a 
justice of the peace." Ibid. More recent definitions 
have not much changed.7 
0 Tho United States Commi~sioner sy~tem ha~, of cour.-;e, been 
rcplacrd by tho Federal Magi~tratc~ Act of 1961-i, 82 Stat. 1107. 
7 Webster's Dictionary, 2d edit·ion, 1957, define:; magi~t.ratc a~ 
"a person clothed with power as n public civil officer; a public 
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An examination of the Court's decisions reveals that 
the terms "magistrate" and "judicial officer" have been 
used interchangeably. Little attempt was made to define 
either term, to distinguish the one from the other, or to 
advance one as the definitive Fourth Amendment require-
ment. We find no commandment in either term, how-
ever, that all warrant authority must reside exclusively 
in a lawyer or judge. Such a requirement would have 
been incongruous when even within the federal system 
warrants were until recently widely issued by nonlawyers.8 
To attempt to extract further significance from the 
above terminology would be both unnecessary and futile. 
The substance of the Constitution's warrant requirements 
does not turn on the labelling of the issuing party. The 
warrant traditionally has represented an independent as-
surance that a search and arrest will not proceed without 
probable cause to believe that a crime has been com-
mitted and that the person or place named in the war-
rant is involved in the crime. Thus an issuing magistrate 
must meet two tests. He must be neutral and detached, 
and he must be capable of determining whether probable 
cause exists for the requested arrest or search. This Court 
long has insisted that inferences of probable cause be 
drawn by "a neutral and detached magistrate instead of 
civil officer invested with executive or jud,icial power;;, ... " or, 
more narrowly, "a magistrate of a class ha,vi.ng summary, oJtea 
criminal, jurisdiction, as a ju::;t ice of the pracc, or one of certain 
officials having a similar juri~diction; ... " Hnndom House Dic-
tionar)· (1966) define~ magif:>trate as (1) "a ci,·il oiftcer charged 
with the administration of the law" and (2) a minor judicial oJ!icer, 
as n ju~tice of the peace, or police just irr, having jurisdict io11 to 
try minor criminal cases and to conduct preliminary examinations 
of persons charged with serious crimes." 
'United Stntes Commissioners were not required to be la\\"y('J"i:i 
until pnssagc of the Federal J\l:lgistratcs Act of HJGS. Even under 
this Act, a limited cxpcction to lawyer'~ status is afforded part-time 
magi~trate:;. 28 U. S. C. § 631 (b) (1). 
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being judged by tho officer engaged in the often com-
petitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Johnson v. 
United States, supra, at 13--14; Giondenello v. United 
States, supra, at 486. In Cool·iclge v. New H wnpshire, 
supra, the Court last Term voided a search warrant is-
sued by tho state attorney general "who was actively in 
charge of the investigation and later was to be chief 
prosecutor at trial." I cl., at 450. lf, on the other hand, 
detachment and capacity do conjoin, the magistrate has 
satisfied the Fourth Amendment's purpose. 
III 
The requisite detachment is present in the case at hand. 
Whatever else neutrality and detachment might entail, 
it is clear that it requires severance and disengagement 
from activities of law enforcement. There has been no 
sho,Ying whatever here of partiality, or affiliation of 
these clerks with prosecutors or police. The record shows 
no connection with any law enforcement activity or 
authority \vhich would distort the independent judgment 
tho Fourth Amendment requires. Appellant himself ex-
pressly refused to allege anything to that effect.u The 
municipal court clerk is assigned not to the police or 
prosecutor but to the municipal court judge for whom 
he docs much of his ,,,.ork. In this sense, he may well be 
tonned a "judicial officer." While a statutorily specified 
term of office and appointment by someone other than 
"an executive authority" might be desirable, the absence 
of such features is hardly disqualifying. Judges them-
selves take office under differing circumstances. Some 
are appointed, but most are elected by legislative bodies 
or by the people. Many enjoy but limited terms and are 
subject to re-appointment or re-election. Most depend 
for their salary level upon the legislative branch. We 
"Tr. of Ornl Arg. , p. 10. 
71-54.f5-0PI~IO~ 
SHADWICK v. CITY OF TAMPA 7 
will not vault requirements for the independence of a 
municipal clerk to a level higher than prevailing with 
respect to many judges. The clerk's neutrality is clear 
enough: he is removed from prosecutor or police and 
works within the judicial branch subject to the super-
vision of the municipal court judge. 
Appellant likewise has failed to demonstrate that these 
clerks lack capacity to determine probable cause. The 
clerk's authority extends only to t·he issuance of arrest 
warrants for breach of municipal ordinances. vVe pre-
sume from the nature of the clerk's position that he 
would be able to deduce from the facts on an affidavit 
before him whether there >vas probable cause to believe 
a citizen guilty of impaired driving, breach of peace, 
drunkenness, trespass or the multiple other common of-
fenses covered by a municipal code. There has been 
no showing that this is too difficult a task for a. clerk to 
accomplish. Our legal system has long entrusted non-
lawyers to evaluate more complex and significant factual 
data than that in the case at hand. Grand juries daily 
determine probable cause prior to rendering indictments, 
and trial juries assess whether guilt is proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The significance and responsibility of 
these lay judgments betrays any belief that the Tampa 
clerks could not determine probable cause for arrest. 
We decide today only that clerks of the municipal 
court may constitutionally issue the warrants in ques-
tion. We have not considered whether the actual is-
suance was based upon an adequate showing of prob-
able cause. Appellant did not submit this question to 
the courts below, 237 So. 2d 231 (19-), 250 So. 2d 4 
( 1971) , and we will not decide it here initially. The 
single question is whether power has been lawfully 
vested, not whether it has been exercised constitutionally. 
Nor need we determine whether a State may lodge 
warrant authority in someone entirely outside the sphere 
71-5--!45-0PIKION 
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of the judicial branch. Many persons may not qualify 
as the kind of "public civil officers" "·e have come to 
associate with the term "magistrate." Had the Tampa 
clerk been entirely divorced from a judicial position, this 
case would have presented different considerations. 
Here, however, the clerk is an employee of the judicial 
branch of the city of Tampa, disassociated from the role 
of law enforcement. We think the independent status 
of his position is fully established. 
What we do reject today is any per se invalidation of 
a state or local warrant system on the ground that the 
issuing magistrate is not a lawyer or judge. Communi-
ties may have sound reasons for delegating the respon-
sibility of issuing warrants to competent personnel other 
than judges or lawyers.10 Many municipal courts face 
stiff and uurelenting caseloads,'1 A judge pressured with 
the docket before him may give warrant applications 
more brisk and summary treatment than would a clerk. 
All this is not to imply that a judge or lawyer would 
not normally provide the most desirable review of war-
rant requests. But our federal system warns of convert-
ing desirable practice into constitutional commandment. 
It recognizes in plural and diverse state activity 1 ~ one 
10 The Frderal l\1ngistra!r., Act explicitly make~ proYi~ion for 
nonlawyer~ to be appointed in those communities whrrC' membrrs 
of the bar arc not nntilable. 28 U.S. C. §631 (b)(1). 
11 See generally C. Whitebread ed., Ma~s Production Justice and 
thr Conotitutionnl Ic!C'ni ( 1970). 
'"States diff<'r significantly in whom they rntru~t :wthorit~· to 
grant a warrant. See Burke v. Su]Jerior Courl, 3 Ariz. App. 576, 
416 P. 2d 997, 1000 (Ct. App. Ariz. 1966) ; Parks v. Superior Court, 
236 P. 2d 874, 882 (Cal. 1951); Kennedy v. Walker, 135 Conn. 262, 
63 A. 2d 589, 594 (Sup. Ct. Conn. 1948); Crane v. State, 257 A. 2d 
768, 773-774 (Sup. Ct. Del. 1969); Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 250 
So. 2d 4 (Sup. Ct. Fla. 1971) ; State \'. Swafford, 250 Ind. 541, 237 
N. E. 2d 580, 584 (Sup. Ct. Ind. 1968); French v. Ilendricks Sttperior 
Court, 252 Ind. 213, 242 N. E. 2d 519, 520 (Sup. Ct. Ind. 1969); 
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key to national innova.tiveness and vitality. Harlan, 
Thoughts at a Dedication: Keeping the Judicial Func-
tion in Balance, 49 A. B. A. J. 943, 944 ( 1963). States 
are entitled to some flexibility and leeway in their desig-· 
nation of magistrates, so long as all arc neutral and 
detached and capable of the probable cause determina-
tion required of them. 
WE' affirm the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court. 
Bailey v. Hudspeth, 164 Kan. 600, 191 P. 2d 894, 898 (Sup. Ct. Kan .. 
1948); State v. Guidry, 247 La. 631, 173 So. 2d 192, 194 (Sup. Ct. La. 
1965); Wampler v. Warden of Maryland Penitentiary, 231 Md. 639, 
191 A. 2d 594, 600 (Ct. App. Md. 1963); Lockapelle v. United Shoe 
Machinery Corporation, 318 Mass. 166, 61 N. E. 2d 8, 10 (Sup. 
Ct. Mass. 1945); State v. Perlick, 211 l\Iinn. 40, 151 N. W. 2d 
591 (Sup. Ct. Md. 1961) ; People v. Richeter, 206 Misc. 304, 133 
N. Y. S. 2d 685, 688 (1954); State v. Ji'urmage, 2.50 N. C. 616, 109 
8. E. 2d 563, 570 (Sup. Ct. N. C. 1959); Moseley v. W elch, 218 
S. C. 242, 62 S. E. 2d 313, 317 (Sup. Ct. S. C. 1950); State v. 
Jrff erson, 79 Wa8h. 2d. 345, 485 P. 2d 77, 70 (Sup. Ct. Wa~h. 1971); 
State v. Thompson, 151 W. Va . 226, 151 S. E. 2d 870, 873 (Sup. 
Ct. App. W. Va. 1966); State v. Simpson, 28 Wis. 2d 540, 137 N. W. 
2d 391 (Sup. Ct. Wis. 1965); State v. Van B1·ocklin, 194 Wis. 441; 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
The charter of Tampa, Florida authorizes the issuance 
of certain arrest warrants by clerks of the Tampa Mu-
nicipal Court.1 The sole question in this case is whether 
1 The relevant Floridn. st:1t.utc:'s and Tampa charter provisions 
arr as follows: 
1. Florid:1 Statute (1967) Section 168.04, F. S. A., which rcadti 
as follows: 
"The clerk may admini~tcr an oath to and take affidavit of any 
person charging anoth!'r with an offense by breaeh of an ordinance, 
and may issue a warrant to the marshall to have the accused prrson 
arrested and brought before the mayor for trial. The marshall may, 
in the ab enre of the mayor and clerk from the police station, ad-
minister oaths to affidavits of complaints and issue warrants for 
the arrrst of prrsons complained against." 
2. Section 495 of the Charter of the City of Tampa enacted by 
the legislature of the State of Florida in Srrtion 17, Chapter 5363, 
Laws of Florida, 1903, which read~ as follows: 
"The Chief of Police, or any policeman of the City of Tampa may 
arrest, without warrant, any person violating any of the ordinances 
of said city, committed in the presence of such officer, and when 
knowledge of the violation of any ordinance of said city shall com(} 
to said chief of police or policeman, not committed in his presence, 
he shall at once make affidavit, before the judge or clerk of the 
municipal court, against the person charged with such violation, 
... 
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these clerks qualify as neutral and detached magistrates 
for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. We hold that 
they do. 
Appellant was arrested for impaired driving on a war-
rant issued by a clerk of the municipal court. He moved 
the court to quash the " ·arrant on the ground that it was 
issued by a nonjudicial officer in violation of the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. ·when the motion >vas 
denied, he initiated proceedings in the Florida courts by 
means of that State's writ of common law certiorari. 
The state proceedings culminated in the holding of the 
Florida Supreme Court that "the clerk and deputy clerks 
of the municipal court of the city of Tantpa are neutral 
and detached magistrates ... for the purpose of issuing 
arrest "·arran ts within the requirements of the United 
States Constitution .... " 250 So. 2d 4, 5 (1971). \Ve 
noted proable jmisdiction, 404 U.S. 1014 (1972). 
I 
A clerk of the munipical court is appointed by the city 
clerk from a classified list of civil servants and assigned 
to work in the municipal court. The statute does not 
specify the qualifications necessary for this job, but no 
law degree or special legal training is required. The 
clerk's duties are to receive traffic fines, prepare the 
court's dockets and records, fill out commitment papers 
"·hrreupon ~:1id judge or rlrrk :,;hall i~~11c n warrant for the arrest of 
Rll r h per~on." 
3. Scrtion H\0 of thr Ch:trtcr of thr Cit~· of Tnmpa enacted by 
the legishture of the State of Florida in Srction 1, Chapter Gl-2915, 
Laws of Florida , 19Gl, whirh rend~ a~ follows: 
"The city rlrrk of the Cit~· of Tampa, with thr approval of the 
mnyor, ma:v appoint onr or more dqmt irs. surh deputy or deputies 
to be selected from the appron•cl cla~~ificd li~t of the rity ri\·il ~rrTirr, 
:t11cl to have and rxrrc·i~e thr Rame powrr~ as the cit~· rlrrk himself, 
including but not limited to the issuance of w:1rr:mt~. One or more 
of such deputies may be designated as clerks of the municipal court." 
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and perform other routine clerical tasks. Apparently he 
may iRsue subpoenas. He may not, however, sit as a 
judge, and he may not issue a search warrant or even a 
felony or misdemeanor arrest warrant for violations of 
state la,Ys. The only warrants he may issue are for the 
arrest of those charged with having breached municipal 
ordinances of the city of Tampa. 2 
Appellant, contending that the Fourth Amendment 
requires that warrants be issued by "judicial officers," 
argues that even this limited warrant authority is con-
stitutionally invalid. He reasons that warrant applica-
tions of whatever nature cannot be assured the discern-
ing, independent review compelled by the Fourth Amend-
ment when the review is performed by less than a judicial 
officer." It is less than clelir, however, as to who would 
qualify as a "j ucl icial officer" under appellant's theory. 
There is some suggestion in appellant's brief that a ju-
dicial officer must be a lawyer or the municipal court 
judge himself." A more complete portrayal of appellant's 
position '"oulcl be that the Tampa clerks are disqualified 
as judicial officers 11ot merely because they are not lawyers 
or judges, but beeause they lack the institutional inde-
pendence associated "·ith the judiciary in that they are 
members of the civil service, appointed by the city clerk, 
"an executive official," and enjoy no statutorily specified 
tenure in office." 
II 
Past decisions of the Court have mentioned rev1ew 
by a "judicial officer" prior to issuance of a warrant, 
Whitley v. Warden, 401 U. S. 560, 564 (1971); Katz v. 
United States, 389 U. S. 347, 356 (1967); Wong Sun v. 
United Stales, 371 U. S. 471, 481-482 (1963); Jones v. 
"Tr. of Oral Arg ., j)!). 6, 7, 20, 21. 
~Appellant '~ BriPf, p . 6: Tr. of Or:d Ar~. , p. 10. 
"Appellanl '~ Brief, Jlp. 12-13; Repl~· Brief, p. 8. 
" Reply Brief, p . 8; Tr. of Oml Arg., pp. 10-12. 
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United States, 362 U. S. 257. 270 (1960); Johnson v. 
United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14 (1948). In some cases 
the term "judicial officer" appears to have been used 
interchangeably with that of "magistrate." Katz v. 
United States, and Johnson v. United States, supra. In 
others it was intended simply to underscore the now ac-
cepted fact that someone independent of the police and 
prosecution must determine probable cause. Jones v. 
United States, supra; liVong Sun v. United States, supra. 
The very term "judicial officer" implies, of course, some 
connection with the judicial branch. But it has never 
been held that only a lawyer or judge could grant a 
warrant, regardless of the court system or the type of 
warrant involved. In Jones, supra, 270- 271, the Court 
implied that United States Commissioners, many of 
whom were not lawyers or judges, were nonetheless "inde-
pendent judicial officers." 6 
The Court frequently has employed the term "magis-
trate" to denote those who may issue warrants. Coolidge 
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,449- 453 (1971); Whit-
ley v. Warden, supra, at 566; Katz v. United States, supra, 
at 356-357; Un·ited States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 
(1965); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U. S. 480, 486 
(1958); Johnson v. United States, supra, at 13-14; United 
States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932). Histori-
cally a magistrate has been defined broadly as "a public 
civil officer, possessing such power, legislative, executive 
or judicial, as the government appointing him may or-
dain," Compton v. Alabama, 214 U. S. 1, 7 (1909), or, 
in a narrower sense "an inferior judical officer, such as a 
justice of the peace." Ibid. More recent definitions 
have not much changed.7 
G Tho United States Commi~sioner system hn R, of <"OUI'~l', hl'ell 
replaced by the Federal Magist rates Act of 1968, 82 Slat. 1107. { 
7 In Compton, a. notary public was deemed a "magistrate," but the 
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An examination of the Court's decisions reveals that 
the terms "magistrate" and "judicial officer" have been 
used interchangeably. Little attempt was made to define· 
either term., to distinguish the one from the other, or to 
advance one as the definitive Fourth Amendment require-
ment. We find no commandment in either term, how-
ever, that all warrant authority must reside exclusively 
in a lawyer or judge. Such a requirement would have 
been incongruous when even within the federal system 
warrants were until recently widely issued by nonlawyers.8 
To attempt to extract further significance from the 
above terminology would be both unnecessary and futile. 
The substance of the Constitution's warrant requirements 
does not turn on the labelling of the issuing party. The 
warrant traditionally has represented an independent as-
surance that a search and arrest will not proceed without 
probable cause to believe that a crime has been com-
mitted and that the person or place named in the war-
rant is involved in the crime. Thus an issuing magistrate 
must meet two tests. He must be neutral and detached, 
Court has nowhere indicated that the term denotes solely a lawyer A 
or judge. ~ 
1\.ebster's Dictionary, 2d edition, 1957, defines magistrate as 
"a person clothed with power as a public civil officer; a public 
ciYil offtcer invested with executive or judicial power::;, ... " or, 
more narrowly, "a magistrate of a clas::; having smnmar.v, often 
nimiual, juri ·diction, as a justice of the peace, or one of certain 
olliriab having a similar jurisdiction; ... " Handom House Dic-
tionary (1966) define::; magistrate a::; (1) "a civil officer charged 
with the admini::;tration of the law" and (2) "a minor judicial officer, 
as a justice of tho peace, or police ju::;ticc, having jurisdiet.ion to 
try minor criminal ca~e~ and to conduct preliminary examinations 
of persons charged with serious crimes." 
"United Statrs Commi~~ioner.; wE're 11ot rcquirrd to be bw~·crs 
until passage of the Federal Magistrates Art of 190S. EYE'tt under 
this Act, a limited expection to lawyer's status is afforded part-time 
magistrates. 28 U. S. C. § 631 (b) (1). 
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and he must he capable of determining whether probable 
cause exists for the requested arrest or search. This Court 
long has insisted that inferences of probable cause be 
drawn by "a neutral and detached magistrate instead of 
being judged by the officer engaged in the often com-
petitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Johnson v. 
United States, supra, at 13- 14; Giordenello v. United 
States, supra, at 486. In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 
supra, the Court last Term voided a search warrant is-
sued by the state attorney general "who was actively in 
charge of the investigation and later was to be chief 
prosecutor at trial." Id., at 450. If, on the other hand, 
detachment and capacity clo conjoin, the magistrate has 
satisfied the Fourth Amendment's purpose. 
III 
The requisite detachment is present in the case at hand. 
·whatever else neutrality and detachment might entail, 
it is clear that it requires severance and disengagement 
from activities of law enforcement. There has been no 
showing \Yhatever here of partiality, or affiliation of 
these clerks with prosecutors or police. The record shows 
no connection \Yith any law enforcement activity or 
authority which would distort the independent judgment 
the Fourth Amendment requires. Appellant himself ex-
pressly refused to allege anything to that effect.n The 
municipal court clerk is assigned not to the police or 
prosecutor but to the municipal court judge for whom 
he does much of his work. In this sense, he may well be 
termed a "judicial officer." While a statutorily specified 
term of office and appointment by someone other than 
"an executive authority" might be desirable, the absence 
of such features is hardly disqualifying. Judges them-
selves take office under differing circumstanccs. Some 
(I Tr. of Oral Arg., p. 10. 
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are appointed, but many are elected by legislative 'bodies 
or by the people. Many enjoy but limited terms and are 
subject to re-appointment or re-election. Most depend 
for their salary level upon the legislative branch. We 
will not vault requirements for the independence of a 
municipal clerk to a level higher than prevailing with 
respect to many judges. The clerk's neutrality has not ( 
been impeached: he is removed from prosecutor or police 
and works within the judicial branch subject to the super-
vision of the municipal court judge. 
Appellant likewise has failed to demonstrate that these 
clerks lack capacity to determine probable cause. The 
clerk's authority exteuds only to the issuance of arrest 
warrants for breach of municipal ordinances. \Ye pre-
sume from the nature of the clerk's position that he 
would be able to deduce from the facts on an affidavit 
before him \vhether there 'vas probable cause to believe 
a citizen guilty of impaired driving, breach of peace, 
drunkenness, trespass or the multiple other common of-
fenses covered by a municipal code. There has been 
no sho,ring that this is too difficult a task for a clerk to 
accomplish. Our legal system has long entrusted non-
lawyers to evaluate more complex and significant factual 
data than that in the case at hand. Grand juries daily 
determine probable cause prior to rendering indictments, 
and trial juries assess \Yhether guilt is pwved beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The significance and responsibility of 
these la.y judgments betrays any belief that the Tan1pa 
clerks could not determine probable cause for arrest. 
We decide today only that clerks of the municipal 
court may constitutionally issue the warrants in ques-
tion. We have not considered whether the actual is-
suance was based upon an adequate showing of prob-
able cause. Aguilar v. Texns, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). Ap-
pellant did not submit this question to the courts below, 
237 So. 2d 231 (10-), 250 So. 2d 4 (1071), and we will l 
71-54-!5-0 PI.N10N 
SII:\DWICK v. CITY OF TAMPA 
not decide it hero initially. The single question is whether· 
power has been lawfully vested , not whether it has been 
constitutionally exercised. 
Nor need \Ve determine whether a State may lodge 
warrant authority in someone entirely outside the sphere 
of the judicial branch. Many persons may not qualify 
as the kind of "public civil officers" we have come to 
associate with tho term ''magistrate." Had the Tampa 
clerk been entirely divorced from a judicial position, this 
case would have presented different considerations .. 
Here, however, the clerk is an employee of the judicial 
branch of the city of Tampa, disassociated from the role ( 
of law enforcement. On the record in this case, the inde-
pendent status of the clerk cannot be questioned. 
What we dG reject today is any per se invalidation of 
a state or local warrant system on the ground that the 
issuing magistrate is not a lawyer or judge. Communi-
ties may have sound reasons for delegating the respon-
sibility of issuing warrants to competent personnel other 
than judges or lawyers.10 Many municipal courts face 
stiff and unrelenting caseloads.11 A judge pressured with 
the docket before him may give warrant applications 
more brisk and summary treatment than would a clerk. 
All this is not to imply that a judge or lawyer would 
not normally provide the most desirable review of war-
rant requests. But our federal system warns of convert-
ing desirable practice into constitutional commandment. 
10 Some communities, such as those in rural or Rpm·~ely settled I 
areas, may have a shortage of available lawyers and judges and must 
rntrust responsibility for issuing warrants to other qualifird per~ons. 
The Federal 1\Iagi~trate~ Act, for example, explicitly m:tkes pro\·i~ion 
Ior nonlaywers to be appointed in those communities where members 
of the bar arc not available. 28 U.S. C.§ 631 (b) (1). 
11 See generally C. Whitebread cd., Mass Production Justice and 
tlw Constitutional Ideal (1970). 
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It recognizes in plural and diverse state activity 12 one 
key to national innovativeness and vitality.13 States 
are entitled to some flexibility and leeway in their desig-
nation of magistrates, so long as all are neutral and 
detached and capable of the probable cause determina-
tion required of them. 
We affirm the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court. 
'"States differ Rign ificantly iu whom thry rntru~t authority to 
grant a warrant. See Burke v. Supe1ior Court, 3 Ariz. App. 576, 
416 P. 2d 997, 1000 (Ct. App. Ariz. 1966): Parks v. Superior Court, 
236 P. 2d 874, 882 (1st D. C. A. Cal. 1951); Kennedy v. Walker, 135 
Conn. 262, 63 A. 2d 589, 594 (Sup. Ct. Conn. 1948); Grano v. State,. 
257 A. 2d 768, 773-774 (Sup. Ct. Del. 1969); Shadwick v. City of 
Tampa, 250 So. 2d 4 (Sup. Ct. Fla. 1971); State v. Swafford, 250 
Ind. 541, 237 N. E. 2d 580, 584 (Sup. Ct. Ind. 1968); French v. 
Ilendricks Superior Court, 252 Ind. 213, 242 N. E. 2d 519 (Sup. Ct. 
Ind. 1969); Bailey v. Hudspeth, 164 Kan. 600, 191 P. 2d 894, 898 
(Sup. Ct. Kan. Hl48); State v. Guidry, 247 La. 631, 173 So. 2d 192, 
194 (Sup. Ct. La. 1965); Wampler v. JiVarden of Ma~·yland Peniten-
tia,ry, 231 Md. 639, 191 A. 2d 594, 600 (Ct. App. Md. 1963); Locka-
pelle v. United Shue Machinery Corporation, 318 Mass. 166, 61 N. E. 
2d 8, 10 (Sup. Ct. Ma~s. 1945); State v. Perlick, 211 Minn. 40, 151 
N. W. 2d 591 (Sup. Ct. Minn. 1961); People v. Richter, 206 Misc. 
304, 133 N.Y. S. 2d 685, 688 (1954); State v. Funnagc, 250 N . C. 616, 
109 S. E. 2d 563, 570 (Sup. Ct. N. C. 1959); Moseley v. Welch, 218 
S. C. 242, 62 S. E. 2cl 313, 317 (Sup. Ct. S. C. 1950); State v. 
Jefferson, 79 Wa~h. 2d 345, 485 l'. 2d 77, 79 (Sup. Ct. Wa~h. 1971); 
State v. Thompson, 151 W. Va. 226, 151 S. E. 2d 870, 873 (Sup. 
Ct. App. W.Va. 1966); State v. Simpson, 28 Wis. 2d 590, 137 N. W. 
2d 391 (Sup. Ct. Wis. 1965); State v. VanBrocklin, 194 Wis. 441; 
217 N. W. 277 (Sup. Ct. Wis. 1927). 
13 Harlan, Thoughts at a Dedication: Keeping the Judicial Func-
tion in Balance, 49 A. B. A. J. 943, 944 (1963). 
